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CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: THE FUTURE OF
THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
Milena Sterio*
INTRODUCTION

In October 2017, the United States Supreme Court will entertain
oral arguments in Jesner v. Arab Bank, a case involving the scope of
corporate liability for human rights abuses under the Alien Tort
Claims Act ("ATCA"). 1 In Jesner, a group of terrorist attacks victims
in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank have sued a Jordan-based bank,
alleging that the bank supported and financed terrorism through
maintaining accounts for known terrorists, accepting donations that it
knew would be used to fund terrorism, and distributing so-called
"martyrdom payments" to families of suicide bombers. 2 The bank has
denied any wrong-doing and has emphasized its self-described role as
an active and leading partner in socio-economic development in the
Middle East. 3 The legal issue before the Supreme Court is not whether
the plaintiffs' allegations are true, but instead whether the bank, as a
corporate entity, can be sued in United States' court at all, under the
ATCA.
The issue of corporate liability under the A TCA was already
litigated in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 4 In Kiobel, however,
the Supreme Court did not ultimately determine whether corporations
can be held liable under the ATCA. 5 Instead, the Court determined
that the A TCA was presumptively territorial, and that the plaintiffs
in Kiobel could not overcome the presumption of territoriality. 6 Thus,
the Court held that cases brought under the ACTA had to "touch

*
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1.

Amy Howe, An Introduction to the Alien Tort Statute and Corporate
Liability: In Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 24, 2017),
http:/ /www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/introduction-alien-tort-statute
corporate-liability-plain-english/ [https:/ /perma.cc/86UU-43QT ].

2.

Id.

3.

Id.

4.

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).

5.

Id. at 1669.

6.

Id.
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and concern" the United States in order to proceed under this Act
and that the alleged conduct in Kiobel did not sufficiently concern
United States' interests. 7
Kiobel left many questions unanswered. First, circuit courts have
been split as to how to interpret the territoriality requirement under
the ATCA. 8 In this regard, the holding of ATCA cases typically fall
into one of three categories: (1) that the alleged tortious conduct had
to have occurred within the United States, (2) that only
relevant/some tortious conduct had to have taken place on American
soil, or (3) that the presence of American parties to the litigation may
be sufficient to overcome the presumption of territoriality. 9 Second,
Kiobel did not address the issue of applicable law, namely whether
domestic or international law should apply to the issue of whether
corporations can be sued under the ATCA? 10 Those in favor of
corporate liability prefer the application of domestic law, which may
lead to an easier conclusion that corporations can be sued and held
liable under the Act, while those opposed to corporate liability may
prefer the application of international law, under which it is uncertain
whether corporations may incur civil liability.11 Lastly, Kiobel did not
answer the most fundamental issue: whether corporations may be
sued under the ATCA, and if so, under what circumstances? 12
This Paper will address these complex legal issues in light of and
in the context of the Jesner case. In Part I, this Paper will provide a
brief overview of the Jesner case. In Part II, this Paper will outline
the Kiobel case and its holding. In Part III, this Paper will discuss
Kiobel's shortcomings, including the vagueness of its "touch and
concern" test and its failure to specify which law - international or
domestic - applies to the issue of corporate liability under the ATCA.
In Part IV, this paper will then propose other remedies to address
corporate misbehavior and complicity in the violation of human
rights, including criminal liability and lawsuits against corporate
officers. In sum, this paper will conclude that the ATCA may not be
the best vehicle to address corporate violations of human rights
(although, in the author's humble opinion, the Supreme Court will
most likely decide for the plaintiffs in the Jesner case, and in favor of
corporate liability under the ATCA).
7.

Id.

8.

Id.

9.

See Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1671.

10.

See generally Kiobel, 133 S.Ct.,(failing to answer the question of
whether domestic or international law should be used in ATCA cases).

11.

See infra Part III.

12.

See generally Kiobel, 133 S.Ct., (failing to answer the question of
whether corporations may be sued under the ATCA).
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I. JESNER V. ARAB BANK
Jordan's Arab Bank was founded in Jerusalem nearly a century
ago. 13 As of today, it has over 600 branches on five continents. 14 In
light of its work with the U.S. Agency for International Development,
as well as other organizations, such as Oxfam, Save the Children, and
Catholic Relief Services, Arab Bank has described itself as "an active
and leading partner in the socio-economic development" of the Middle
East. 15 Both the United States' and the Israeli governments have
worked with the bank - the former has characterized it as a
"constructive partner" in the efforts to prevent terrorism financing
and the latter has used Arab Bank as a conduit to transfer taxes
collected for the Palestinian Authority. 16
Despite this seemingly positive image of Arab Bank, a group of
plaintiffs has recently sued the bank in United States' federal court.17
The plaintiffs, a group of victims of terrorist attacks committed in
Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza between 1995 and 2005, allege that
Arab Bank aided and abetted terrorist activity, by maintaining
accounts for known terrorists, accepting donations that would be used
to fund terrorism, and distributing millions of dollars to families of
suicide bombers (so-called "martyrdom payments") .18 The plaintiffs'
law suit was filed under the ACTA - a federal law, enacted as part of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, which gives federal courts jurisdiction over
"any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. " 19 It is unclear as
13.

Howe, supra note 1.

14.

Id.

15.

Id.

16.

Id.

17.

See Complaint at *1-2, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. CV 06 3869,
2006 WL 4807223 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2006) (listing the parties' names).

18.

Id. at *38.

19.

28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 1948); See generally, Anthony J. Bellia Jr. &
Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78
U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 447 (2011) (discussing the history and meaning of
the ATS); Curtis A. Bradley, Attorney General Bradford's Opinion and
the Alien Tort Statute, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 509, 509 (2012) (explaining
debates over the ATS and the reliance by participants in those debates
on a 1795 opinion by U.S. Attorney General William Bradford); Curtis
A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT'L L.
587, 588 (2002) (detailing the history of the ATS); Curtis A. Bradley,
Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International
Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 870
(2007) (analyzing the Court's Sosa decision within the context of its
Erie decision and considering several areas of likely debate concerning
the ATS); William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort
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to why ATCA was enacted; Judge Friendly famously stated that "no
one seems to know whence it came," and described this act as a "kind
of a judicial Lohengrin," after the mythical German knight who
suddenly arrives by boat pulled by swans. 20
ATCA remained dormant until 1980, when two Paraguayan
citizens filed a lawsuit in United States' federal court under this act,
alleging that a Paraguayan police official tortured their son and
brother to death. 21 This case, Filartiga v. Pena-Irnla, effectively
resurrected the ATCA and established the precedent that United
States' courts will hear cases involving violations of international law
norms committed against alien plaintiffs. 22 In the three decades
following Filartiga, plaintiffs began to increasingly rely on the ATCA
to bring suits against foreign defendants and government officials, but
also large multinational corporations, for their role in aiding and
abetting human rights violations committed by foreign governments. 23
In light of such increasing reliance on the A TCA, since Filartiga, the
Supreme Court has twice weighed in to limit the scope and reach of
the ATCA. 24 In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court held
that the ATCA is purely a jurisdictional statute which does not

Statute: Some Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 687,
689 (2002) (arguing, among other things, that "the Framers wanted to
give the federal courts jurisdiction over suits involving the law of
nations"); Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing:
International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 463, 466 (1997) (discussing Filartiga, "[t]he break-through ATCA
case"); Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain:
What Piracy Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 112 (2004) (noting a debate concerning the
ATS: whether it merely grants jurisdiction or allows suits to be brought
on the basis of "customary international law"); Julian G. Ku, The
Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A
Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 353, 353
(2011) (challenging the common perception that the ATS "imposes
liability on private corporations for violations of customary international
law"); Thomas H. Lee, The Safe Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort
Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 830, 830 (2006) (advancing the "safe
conduct theory," which posits a new role for the ATS it would permit
redress of common law torts that private actors commit so long as there
is a U.S. nexus); Carlos M. Vazquez, Alien Tort Claims and the Status
of Customary International Law, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 531, 531 (2012)
(observing that most scholarly debate on customary international law
has focused on litigation over the ATS).
20.

IIT v. Vencap Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2nd Cir. 1975).

21.

Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2nd Cir. 1980).

22.

Id. at 888-89.

23.

Howe, supra note 1.

24.

Id.
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provide plaintiffs with a cause of action. 25 Instead, the Supreme Court
held that causes of action for lawsuits filed under the ATCA must be
found under the common law, formulated by judges. 26 The Supreme
Court then held that the common law as of 1789, when the ATCA
was enacted, would have contained a narrow set of violations of the
law of nations, including violations of safe-passage guarantees,
violations of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. 27 Thus, according
to the Sosa Supreme Court majority, claims brought under the ATCA
should proceed only if they allege such 181h century-recognized causes
of action and if they are widely accepted as a violation of
international norms. 28 The Court further specified its holding by
cautioning that "the determination whether a norm is sufficiently
definite to support a cause of action should (and, indeed, inevitably
must) involve an element of judgment about the practical
consequences of "allowing litigants to rely on that norm. 29 In addition,
the Court held that courts considering claims filed under the ATCA
should take into account not only whether international law
recognizes the allegedly violated norm, but also whether international
law would allow a particular defendant to face liability "if the
defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual. "30 In
Sosa, the Court ultimately held that the plaintiff's cause of action,
alleging arbitrary detention as a violation of customary international
law, should not be recognized under the ATCA because the
prohibition on arbitrary detention had not reached the status of a
customary norm of law, sufficiently accepted and universal under
international law. 31
Post-Sosa,
federal courts hearing ATCA claims faced
uncertainty. 32 The Sosa holding did not clarify which types of claims
could be potentially recognized as providing a valid cause of action
under the ATCA. 33 In addition, the Sosa holding left open the issue of
corporate liability for aiding and abetting in human rights abuses:
could corporations face liability under the ATCA, or should this

25.

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).

26.

Id. at 724.

27.

Id. at. 715, 724-25.

28.

Id. at 725.

29.

Id. at 732-33.

30.

Id.

31.

Id. at 738.

32.

Roger P. Alford, Human Rights After Kiobel: Choice of Law and the
Rise of Transnational Tort Litigation, 63 EMORY L.J. 1089, 1096-97
(2014).

33.

Id. at 1096-97.
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statute be interpreted as confining lawsuits thereunder as against
private defendants only. 34 This issue was raised in the second ATCA
related Supreme Court case, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 35
Section II below will discuss the Kiobel case in detail, and it will
explain how the Kiobel case left several questions unanswered,
including the issue of corporate liability under the ATCA. 36 Because
lower courts have been reaching conflicting results on this issue, the
Supreme Court (presumably) granted certiorari in Jesner. 37
Jesner plaintiffs allege that Arab Bank "violated the law of
nations insofar as it financed terrorism, and also insofar as it directly
and indirectly engaged in genocide and crimes against humanity. " 38
According to the plaintiffs, when ACTA was enacted it was
"unquestionable" that corporations could face liability in tort law, and
this has remained true until today. 39 Thus, according to the plaintiffs,
the ACTA should be interpreted to include corporations as potential
defendants. 40 While the text of the ATCA limits plaintiffs to "aliens,"
the statute does not contain a similar limitation as to defendants. 41
Moreover, plaintiffs interpret the history and purpose of the ATCA to
support their argument that this statute applies to corporations. 42
They argue that Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789 to ensure,
inter alia, that federal courts had jurisdiction over lawsuits alleging
violations of the law of nations, such as, for example, an assault on a
foreign diplomat. 43 According to the plaintiffs, there is no reason to
believe that Congress wanted to avoid foreign relations problems
created by individuals but not by corporations. 44 In addition, plaintiffs
argue that it is important to hold corporations liable in order to
compensate victims and deter future ATCA violations. 45 In cases
involving the offense of terrorism financing, plaintiffs argue that
34.

Id.

35.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1669.

36.

See infra Part II.

37.

George Rutherglen, Jesner v. Arab: Closing the Door to Human Rights
in Federal Court?, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 5, 2017, 9:30 AM),
https: / /www.justsecurity.org/45632 /.iesner-v-arab-bank-plc-closing-door
human-rights-federal-court/ [https://perma.cc/4MJ3-ALVS].

38.

Howe, supra note 1.

39.

Id.

40.

Id.

41.

Id.

42.

Id.

43.

Id.

44.

Id.

45.

Id.
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"corporate liability is the only meaningful option" because, even if a
plaintiff can correctly identify the individuals involved in the actual
wrongdoing, "securing jurisdiction and collecting judgment against
them would be even more difficult. "46 Various amicus briefs have been
filed supporting the plaintiffs, including a bipartisan brief by Senators
Graham and Whitehouse. 47 The Senators allege that Arab Bank "used
its U.S. office to launder funds for Hamas" and that, if other
defendants like Arab Bank cannot be sued under the ATCA in federal
court for their U.S.-based transactions, this will create "a dangerous
gap that terrorists and their funders may exploit. "48
Jesner Bank has countered the plaintiffs' arguments by relying on
Sosa. The Bank argues that, in light of Sosa, the plaintiffs' case can
go forward only if plaintiffs can show "that corporate liability is
universally recognized in international law. "49 Jesner Bank argues that
plaintiffs have failed to establish an international law norm on
corporate liability because plaintiffs have failed to "point the Court to
a single instance of a corporation being held liable by an international
tribunal under customary international law. "50 The Bank also
highlights a potential discrepancy that extending ATCA liability to
corporations would create: under United States' law, corporations do
not face liability in similar areas of the law, such as private lawsuits
seeking damages for civil rights violations, under the Supreme Court
1972 Bivens holding. 51 Moreover, Jesner Bank dismisses the Senators'
argument that not extending the ATCA's reach to corporate behavior
would create a "gap" which future terrorists could exploit. 52 The Bank
suggests that other remedies to combat terrorism are available, such
as criminal law, federal regulations, and sanctions regimes. 53
46.

Id.

47.

Id.

48.

Brief of United States Senators Sheldon Whitehouse and Lindsey
Graham as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5-6, Jesner v. Arab
Bank, 2017 WL 2822776 (No. 16-499).

49.

Howe, supra note 1.

50.

Id.

51.

Id; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (stating implied actions to enforce
constitutional guarantees against federal actions are not available
against corporations); see also Anton Metlitsky, Symposium: A Federal
Common-Law Approach to Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort
Statute,
SCOTUSBLOG,
July
26,
2017,
available
at
http:/ /www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/symposium-federal-common-law
approach-corporate-liability-alien-tort-statute/) [https: / /perma.cc/JB66
9W2K].

52.

Howe, supra note 1.

53.

Id.
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According to the Bank, such other remedies are more appropriate
because they allow prosecutors and regulators discretion to exercise
judgment in "an area fraught with foreign policy considerations. "54
The Bank argues that private plaintiffs do not typically exercise the
same discretion and judgment. 55 Jesner Bank is supported through
amicus briefs by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other business
groups. 56 These groups argue that ATCA lawsuits have run rampant
over the past decades. 57 They also highlight that allowing corporate
liability under the ATCA would create an imbalance that Congress
certainly did not intend with a similar federal law, the Torture
Victims Protection Act (TVPA), which allows American plaintiffs to
sue individuals only. 58 As such, they argue extending the ATCA to
corporations would allow aliens to sue private individuals and
corporations, while the TVPA would continue to limit American
citizens' lawsuits to individual defendants. 59 While it is not surprising
that the business community seems united against extending ATCA
liability to corporations, this "imbalance" argument is important and
will most likely be addressed in the near-future Jesner holding. 60
The federal government has taken a middle-ground position in its
amicus brief to the Supreme Court. 61 The government has rejected the
Bank's argument that corporations should never face liability under
the ATCA. 62 However, the government has argued that this particular
lawsuit should not go forward because the allegation that Jesner Bank
54.

Id.

55.

Id.

56.

Id.

57.

Id.

58.

Id.

59.

Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et
al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 6-7, Jesner v. Arab
Bank, PLC (2017) (No. 16-499); see also Metlitsky, supra note 51
(noting that the TVPA does not allow plaintiffs to sue corporations)
("The relevant statute here is the Torture Victim Protection Act, which
was enacted by Congress under the ATS to create an express cause of
action for certain human-rights norms (i.e., torture and extrajudicial
killing). In creating that cause of action, Congress determined that only
natural persons, not corporations, could be liable, as the Supreme Court
held in Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority.").

60.

See generally Howe, supra note 1.

61.

Id.

62.

Brief for the United States of America as Amici Curiae Supporting
Neither Party at 5, Jesner, et al. v. Arab Bank, PLC (2017) (No. 16
499) ("This Court should vacate the decision below, which rests on the
mistaken premise that a federal commonlaw claim under the ATS may
never be brought against a corporation.").
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may have routed foreign transactions in dollars through U.S. branches
does not constitute enough of a nexus and connection with the United
States per Kiobel. 63 It is interesting to note that Jesner Bank itself
made a similar argument to the Supreme Court last year, in order to
prevent the court's review. 64 The Bank argued that the Court should
not address the issue of corporate liability under the ATCA in this
particular case because the plaintiffs' claims "do not have a sufficient
nexus to the United States to be litigated in U.S. courts." 65 The
Supreme Court rejected this argument when it granted certiorari on
the very issue of corporate liability under the A TCA (although the
court will certainly address, in its future holding, issues related to the
required territorial nexus between the claims and the United States). 66
Section II below will discuss the previously-mentioned Kiobel case and
its requirement of territorial connection between ATCA claims and
the United States.

II.

KIOBEL V. DUTCH ROYAL PETROLEUM

In Kiobel, plaintiffs were former residents of Ogoniland, Nigeria,
who filed a lawsuit under the ATCA in United States federal court
against Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, Shell Transport and
Trading Company, and their joint subsidiary, Shell Petroleum
Development Company of Nigeria. 67 Plaintiffs alleged that they began
protesting against the environmental effects of the oil companies'
activities in the Ogoniland region, and that, as a consequence, the
defendants
recruited
the
Nigerian
government
to
crush
demonstrations by carrying out acts of violence, such as rape and
murder, and by looting property. 68 The plaintiffs' complaint alleged
that defendants "aided and abetted these atrocities by, among other
things, providing the Nigerian forces with food, transportation, and
compensation, as well as by allowing the Nigerian military to use
respondents' property as a staging ground for the attacks. "69 Plaintiffs
alleged that defendants violated the law of nations - a required
63.

Id. at 25.

64.

Brief in Opposition at 2, Jesner, et al. v. Arab Bank, PLC (2016) (No.
16-499) ("If the Court were to grant certiorari in this case, it would be
Kiobel all over again: the Court would quickly discover that there is no
need to reach the question of corporate liability because Petitioners'
ATS claims do not have a sufficient nexus to the United States to be
litigated in U.S. court.").

65.

Id.

66.

Howe, supra note 2.

67.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1662.

68.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1662.

69.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1662.
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element of an ATCA-based complaint - by aiding and abetting the
Nigerian government in committing the following acts: (1)
extrajudicial killings, (2) crimes against humanity, (3) torture and
cruel treatment, (4) arbitrary arrest and detention, (5) violations of
the right to life, liberty, security, and association, (6) forced exile, and
(7) property destruction. 70 The district court dismissed some of the
claims but upheld the second, third, and fourth claims; in addition,
the district court certified its order for interlocutory appeal. 71 In
contrast, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the plaintiffs'
entire complaint by holding that "the law of nations does not
recognize corporate liability." 72 The Second Circuit's holding was
criticized on various points, including on the argument that it
misinterpreted part of the Nuremberg precedent. 73 As a result, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, originally on the issue of corporate
liability under the ATCA. 74 However, upon hearing oral arguments,
the Court directed the parties to submit briefs on an additional issue
- "[w]hether and under what circumstances the [ATCA] allows courts
to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations
occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United
States. "75
The Supreme Court thus changed the legal issue that it had
originally agreed to address in Kiobel. By requesting parties to
prepare briefs and arguments on the issue of whether a corporation
may be sued under the ATCA for acts committed abroad (which may
have violated the law of nations), the Supreme Court avoided directly
addressing the issue of corporate liability under the ATCA. 76 "Rather
than address whether corporations may be sued at all under the ATS,
the Court decided to address whether corporations may be sued under
the ATS for acts committed outside the territory of the United
States. "77 Thus, in Kiobel, the Supreme Court determined that the
issue was not "whether petitioners ... stated a proper claim under the
ATS, but whether a claim may reach conduct occurring in the
territory of a foreign sovereign. "78
70.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1663.

71.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1663.

72.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1663.

73.

Michael Kelly, Atrocities by Corporate Actors:
Perspective, 50 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. (2018).

74.

Id.

75.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1663.

76.

Kelly, supra note 73.

77.

Id.

78.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1664.
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The Court then held that in analyzing any congressional statute,
a presumption against extraterritorial application is generally applied.
This presumption is applied because it "serves to protect against
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which
could result in international discord. "79 This presumption, according
to the Kiobel decision, also applies to causes of action under the
ATCA. The presumption against extraterritorial application may be
overcome if the statute in question manifests a "clear indication of
extraterritoriality. "80 According to the Court, the language of the
ATCA did not indicate such clear extraterritoriality intent, and
nothing in the statute's historical background suggested that Congress
had intended for the statute to have such extraterritorial
application. 81 The Court reached this determination by analyzing the
three well-recognized law of nations offenses in 1789: violation of safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. 82
According to the Court, the first two offenses were defined as taking
place within the forum nation and as such could not support the
argument that Congress must have intended the ATCA to have an
extraterritorial reach. 83 Piracy, according to the Court, is a unique
offense because it is not committed within the territory of any
particular nation, and the application of the ATCA to pirates does
not demonstrate a clear intent by Congress to apply this statute
extraterritorially for any other offenses. 84 Thus, the Court determined
that "the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims
under the ATS" and that "nothing in the statute rebuts that
presumption. " 85
The
Court
then
applied
the
presumption
against
extraterritoriality to the facts in Kiobel. In this case, the defendants'
alleged violations of the law of nations occurred abroad. The Court
held that "even where the claims touch and concern the territory of
the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace
the presumption against extraterritorial application. "86 According to
the Court, for claims against multinational corporations, which may
be present in many different countries, "mere corporate presence" in
79.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1664, (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,
499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).

80.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1665, (quoting Morrison v. National Australia Bank
Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010)).

81.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1661, (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 723-34).

82.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1671, (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715).

83.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1666-67.

84.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1667.

85.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1669.

86.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1669.
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the United States does not suffice.s7 The Court thus affirmed the
Second Circuit's dismissal of the plaintiffs' lawsuit, not on the ground
that corporations may never be sued under the ATCA, but because
the "touch and concern" territoriality nexus with the United States
was not present in the Kiobel facts and allegations.ss In Jesner, the
Supreme Court may be attempting to clarify the issue of potential
corporate liability under the ATCA, which Kiobel left open. Section
III below will discuss the most important issues left unanswered by
Kiobel, as well as the implications of such issues on the Jesner case.

III.

KIOBEL AND QUESTIONS LEFT UNANSWERED

The Kiobel opinion has been criticized on different grounds. This
Section will focus on two common criticisms: Kiobel's reliance on the
presumption against extraterritoriality and the majority opinion's
failure to explain how this presumption may be overcome, and
Kiobel's failure to explain which laws - international or domestic 
should govern the issue of corporate liability under the ATCA. s9 This
Section will also discuss Kiobel's implications on Jesner and it will
predict how the Supreme Court may apply Kiobel's framework to
Jesner.
A.

Presumption Against Extraterritoriality: Failure to Explain How It
May be Overcome

Kiobel failed to explain what factors would potentially displace
the presumption of territoriality regarding the ATCA, and what
factors would need to be present in future cases in order to justify the
extraterritorial application of this statute. 90 Both Justice Kennedy and
Justice Breyer wrote concurring opinions in which they challenged the
majority opinion's reliance on the presumption of territoriality. 91
Justice Kennedy pointed out that the Court left a "number of
significant questions" open regarding the future scope and
interpretation of the ATCA. 92 On the other hand, Justice Breyer
noted that the Court's reliance on the presumption against
extraterritoriality "offers only limited help in deciding the question
presented, namely, 'under what circumstances the [ATCA] ... allows
courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of
87.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1669.

88.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1669.

89.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1672-73.

90.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1672-73.

91.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at
1672-73 (Breyer, J., concurring).

92.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the
United States. "' 93 Justice Breyer further argued that although the
majority opinion made clear that an ATCA claim would have to
"touch and concern the territory of the United States.... With
sufficient force to displace the presumption," the majority opinion
"leaves for another day the determination of just when the
presumption against extraterritoriality might be 'overcome. "' 94
Instead, Justice Breyer proposed a different framework for recognizing
future causes of action under the ACTA. According to Justice Breyer,
jurisdiction should exist under the ATCA where "(1) the alleged tort
occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or
(3) the defendant's conduct substantially and adversely affects an
important American interest in preventing the United States from
becoming a safe harbor (free or civil as well as criminal liability) for a
torturer or other common enemy of mankind. "95
In sum, although Kiobel explicitly held that ATS claims must
"touch and concern the territory of the United States" with "sufficient
force" in order to overcome ATCA's presumption of territoriality,
commentators and lower courts have been left wondering as to what
exactly constitutes such "touch and concern" connection with the
United States. 96 Despite the Kiobel holding, one commentator has
argued that the ATCA still "has the potential to provide a foreigner
with a civil remedy from a U.S. court based upon a variety of
customary international law violations committed by a foreign
national and occurring in the territory of a sovereign other than the
United States. "97 Moreover, since Kiobel, lower courts have reached
conflicting results regarding claims brought under the ATCA. 98 One
scholar has summarized the lower courts' decisions when interpreting
the ATCA and the Kiobel mandate to apply the presumption against
extraterritoriality as follows. 99 One set of courts have interpreted
Kiobel to require that the presumption of extraterritoriality may only
be overcome if the law of nations violation occurs in the United

93.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring).

94.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1673.

95.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1671.

96.

See, e.g., Paul L. Hoffman, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: First
Impressions, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 28, 35 (2013) (stating it is
unclear that foreign corporations with more extensive United States
connections would pass the presumption).

97.

Ursula Tracy Doyle, The Evidence of Things Not Seen: Divining
Balancing Factors from Kiobel's "Touch and Concern" Test, 66
HASTINGS L. J. 443, 446-447 (2015).

98.

Id. at 455-56.

99.

Id.
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States. 100 Another set of courts interpret Kiobel to require that only
relevant conduct, and not the law of nations violation itself, occur in
the United States. 101 A third group of courts have decided that Kiobel
allows U.S. citizenship or residency to displace the presumption
against extraterritoriality. 102 A fourth set of courts have reached the
opposite conclusion and have held that U.S. citizenship or residency is
not sufficient to displace the presumption. 103 Finally, a fifth set of
courts have interpreted Kiobel as acknowledging that only Congress
can displace a statute's presumption against extraterritoriality. 104
Some courts have heard A TCA cases without even addressing the
Kiobel "touch and concern" test. 105 According to one scholar, these
conflicting lower court opinions "show the need for a coherent test to
determine when the presumption against the extraterritorial
application of a statute should be displaced." 106
The differing approaches taken by lower courts in ATCA
litigation post- Kiobel clearly demonstrate the necessity for a unified
approach - which the Supreme Court will hopefully provide in Jesner.
Until then, the unsettled issues regarding the "touch and concern"
standard and the presumption against extraterritoriality are likely to
contribute to forum shopping, where savvy plaintiffs will continue to
bring cases in ATSA-friendly districts and circuits. It may be that the
Supreme Court forecloses corporate liability under the ATCA
altogether in Jesner, but in this author's opinion, it is much more
likely that the Supreme Court will clarify Kiobel and allow a limited
number of ATCA lawsuits against corporations.
B.

Applicable Law (Domestic or International) to the Issue of
Corporate Liability Under the A TCA

Another question left unanswered by Kiobel was one of applicable
law: which law, domestic or international, applies to the issue of
corporate liability under the ATCA. 107 In other words, to determine
whether corporations can be sued for human rights violations, does
one look to American tort law or to international law? Some scholars
have argued that the ATCA is a conduct-regulating statute which
incorporates universal norms of the law of nations; thus, according to

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 456.
105. Id. at 456-58.
106. Id. at 456.
107. Alford, supra note 32, at 1100.
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this argument, ATCA is a universal jurisdiction statute. 108 In this
vein, scholars argue that "[w]hen states exercise universal jurisdiction,
they do not apply solely national law to conduct beyond their borders
but an international law that already applied to the conduct when
and where it occurred. " 109
Thus, pursuant to this argument, the relevant law to query
regarding the issue of corporate liability for aiding and abetting in
human rights abuses under a universal jurisdiction statute like the
ATCA would be international law.11° In other words, as a conduct
regulating statute, the ATCA, refers to the law of nations and
incorporates law of nations norms as to liability, it may be argued
that the only relevant question for ATCA claims is whether such
claims "was whether the conduct-regulating rule of decision in ATS
suits- however it is conceptualized-accurately reflects extant rules
of international law, including as to the scope of liability. "lll Thus,
when it comes to the existence of corporate liability under the ATCA,
the only relevant inquiry is whether existing international law norms
authorize such liability. 112
Similarly, another scholar has argued toward the application of
international law to the issue of corporate liability under the ATCA,
stating
[t]o me, it has always seemed that any questions affecting the
substance of a case against an ATS defendants should be
governed by international law, as the ATS' text seems to
demand. The temptation to fill in the many gaps left by
international law with U.S. common law is strong, but the ATS
clearly sought to ask US courts to apply international law.11 3

If one accepts the argument that the issue of corporate liability under
the ATCA should be governed by international, not domestic law, one
may conclude against extending ATCA liability to corporations
because international law does not contain clear and universally
108. See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of
Nations in Kiobel and Beyond, 44 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1329, 1332 (2013).
109. Id. at 1330-34.
110. Id. at 1333.
111. Anthony J. Colangelo, Kiobel: Muddling the Distinction Between
Prescriptive and Adjudicative Jurisdiction, 28 MD. J. INT'L L. 65, 67
(2013).
112. Id. at 70.
113. Julian Ku, The Unattractive Question is Back: SCOTUS (Again)
Considers Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, OPINIO

JURIS (April 3, 2017), http://opiniojuris.org/2017 /04/03/unattractive
question-back-scotus-considers-corporate-liability-alien-tort-statute/
[https://perma.cc/EJQ6-26C2].
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accepted norms on civil liability for corporations.11 4 In other words,
because the Sosa case already limited the ability of federal courts to
recognize as actionable norms under the ATCA to those norms that
are sufficiently uniform, definite and accepted under international law,
it may be argued that U.S. courts should not be embracing novel
causes of action against corporations when international law does not
uniformly establish civil liability for corporations for aiding and
abetting in human rights violations.11 5 If, however, the issue of
corporate liability under the ATCA is to be determined under
domestic law, then an analysis of American federal law would lead
one to conclude that corporations may face liability in civil lawsuits,
given that "[u]nder federal common law, corporations are typically
liable for torts. " 116 As a result, the application of this law would
almost certainly favor the plaintiffs on this question. " 117
The Kiobel majority never reached a definite conclusion on this
issue of applicable law.11 8 Instead, in Kiobel, the Supreme Court
seemed to distinguish between conduct-regulating norms, which for an
ATCA claim are found in the law of nations, and causes of action and
remedies, which are to be determined by the law of the forum.11 9 "The
law of nations creates liability for universal jurisdiction violations, and
the A TS supplies the form of remedy.120 In Kiobel, the Supreme Court
found that although the ATCA - the conduct-regulating statute 
was jurisdictional in nature and incorporated the law of nations, the
relevant cause of action under the ATCA was domestic and
determined by the law of the forum. 121 It may be that the Kiobel
majority would have answered the issue of corporate liability under
the ATCA under the law of the forum/domestic law, if this issue had
actually been addressed. However, because the Kiobel majority
ultimately determined that the case should be dismissed on extra
territoriality grounds, the issue of applicable law remained

114. See Daniel Price, Corporate Liability for International Torts: Did the
Second Circuit Misinterpret the Alien Tort Statute?, 8 SETON HALL Cm.
REV. 43, 55 (2011) (discussing Judge Cabranes' majority opinion in
Kiobel).
115. See generally Kevin Golden, License to Kill? Corporate Liability Under
the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 1 IN THE BALANCE 37, 44 (2012).
116. Ku, supra note 113.
117. Id.
118. Alford, supra note 32, at 1100.
119. See Colangelo, supra note 108, at 1332.
120. Id. at 1344.
121. See Colangelo, supra note 111, at 67 (discussing the questions presented
for re-argument in Kiobel).
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unanswered. 122 It may be that this issue will ultimately be resolved in
Jesner.
C.

Implications for Jesner

In Jesner, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of
corporate liability under the ATCA, presumably to clarify post- Kiobel
confusion. 123 It is worth noting that the Court adopted the plaintiffs'
formulation of the issue: "[w]hether the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350, categorically forecloses corporate liability. "124 By doing this,
the Court may have signaled that it will likely side with the plaintiffs
(it would be difficult to imagine that the Court would hold that
corporations are always and categorically exempt from liability under
the A TCA) .125 Moreover, the fact that the Court granted certiorari on
the issue of corporate liability under the ATCA, which the Court had
avoided in Kiobel, may signal that the Court is willing to tackle this
issue directly and that it is willing to seriously entertain the plaintiffs'
argument. 126 With these two points in mind, it is this author's opinion
that the Court will likely side with the plaintiffs, but that it will
strictly limit corporate liability under the ATCA to a narrow set of
circumstances.
If the Court were to decide that corporations may be sued under
the ATCA post-Kiobel, it will have to clarify that Kiobel does not
foreclose corporate liability altogether under this statute. In addition,
the Court will have to determine, assuming that it does not want to
overturn Kiobel a mere four years after it was decided, that the
presumption against extraterritoriality has been overcome in Jesner.
In order to do this, the Court may have to explain in more detail how
plaintiffs in an ATCA case may overcome the presumption against
extraterritoriality, and what factors in particular are necessary in
order to overcome that presumption. Jesner may thus turn into an
application and clarification of Kiobel - a way for the Supreme Court
to resolve post-Kiobel circuit court splits relating to the ambiguity of
the Kiobel "touch and concern" test. 127 If Jesner were to do this, it
would be a welcome development in Supreme Court jurisprudence.
How likely is it that the Supreme Court will decide in favor of
plaintiffs in the Jesner case? In Jesner, the law of nations violation of
122. See Alford, supra note 32, at 1097 (explaining the Supreme Court's
decision in Kiobel).
123. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017).
124. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 808 F.3d 144 (2017).
125. Id. (explaining that the Supreme Court will decide whether ATCA
categorically forecloses corporate liability).
126. Id.
127. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1669.
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terrorism took place in Israel, West Bank, or Gaza. 128 However, Arab
Bank is being sued for having aided and abetted terrorist activity
through particular financing operations. 129 This law of nations
violation (aiding and abetting terrorism) presumably took place at
different Arab Bank locations and branches. 130 If plaintiffs can
demonstrate that a sufficient number of such financing operations
took place in Arab Bank's United States branches, this may
constitute enough relevant conduct that would "touch and concern"
the United States and thus displace the presumption against
extraterritoriality. 131 The Court may also focus on the alleged
violation of the law of nations itself, aiding and abetting terrorism,
and may decide that deterring terrorism and terrorism financing
sufficiently "touches and concerns" the United States because of a
global American national security interests in preventing terrorist
activity. 132 This kind of ruling would focus on terrorism as a
particularly grave offense under the law of nations and would disallow
other types of ATCA claims where plaintiffs allege other human
rights violations. Under these circumstances, the Court would thus
establish a narrow precedent for future ATCA cases against corporate
defendants, by allowing only cases involving terrorism and terrorism
like violations of the law of nations, within a paradigm where United
States' national security interests are concerned.
If the Supreme Court were to decide in favor of the respondents
in Jesner and to hold that corporations are indeed categorically
exempt from liability under the ATCA, this would not necessarily
imply that no remedies would be available in American courts against
corporations which aid and abet in human rights violations. 133 The
section below will briefly outline other potential remedies against
corporate misbehavior.

128. Howe, supra note 1.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See generally Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(explaining Kiobel's "touch and concern" test).
132. See generally Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(discussing the existence of ATS jurisdiction when there is an important
national interest).
133. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R43293, CORPORATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL LAW (2013) (discussing
instances when corporations may be held criminally liable).
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IV. OTHER REMEDIES FOR CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS

If the Supreme Court decides in favor of the respondents in the
Jesner case, this will bring to end federal court litigation under the

ATCA against corporate defendants. Corporations would not,
however, be completely immune from liability in the United States. 134
Instead, corporations could still face criminal liability in United
States' courts, and corporate officers themselves could continue to
face civil lawsuits for their individual roles in aiding and abetting
human rights abuses. 135
First, it is well established in United States' law that corporations
may face criminal liability for various misdeeds. 136 Under federal law,
corporations and other legal entities may be criminally liable for the
crimes of their employees and agents. 137 Corporations face criminal
liability for violations of regulatory offenses, such as the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, economic offenses, crimes in violation of the
134. See id. (detailing the Supreme Court view that corporations should be
held responsible for their agents and are not immune).
135. See id. at 4 ("As a general rule, '[c]orporations may be held liable for
specific intent offenses based on the 'knowledge and intent' of their
employees.").
136. See id. at 3 (discussing instances when corporations are held liable for
criminal offenses).
137. See id; See also United States v. Agosto-Vega, 617 F.3d 541, 552-53 (1st
Cir. 2010) (holding a corporation liable for the criminal acts of its
agent); United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1118
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding a corporation's intent is dependent on the
wrongful intent of their employees); United States v. Singh, 518 F.3d
236, 249 (4th Cir. 2008) (recognizing a corporation's liability is
dependent on the wrongful acts of their employees with the intent to
benefit the corporation); United States v. Jorgensen, 144 F.3d 236, 249
(4th Cir. 2008) (finding that all the officers, agents, and employees were
acting within the scope of his or her employment when the criminal act
was committed); United States v. Investment Enterprises, Inc., 10 F.3d
263, 266 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Bi-Co Paxers, Inc., 741
F.2d 730, 737 (5'" Cir. 1984)); United States v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 660 (2nd Cir. 1989) (holding that an
extensive compliance program does not immunize the corporation from
liability); United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 822-23 (11th Cir. 1984)
(finding that a corporate defendant is guilty if it can be found beyond a
reasonable doubt that acts and omission committed are done by
company employees within the scope of their employment); United
States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding jury
instructions saying that corporations are liable for the acts of an agent
even if it's contrary to corporation's instructions proper); United States
v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934, 941-42 (6th Cir. 1963) (acknowledging that
corporations may be convicted of a crime through the conduct of its
agents and employees).
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securities laws, as well as common law crimes, such as prostitution. 138
Under "federal law, corporate criminal liability is ordinarily confined
to offenses (a) committed by the corporation's officers, employees, or
agents; (b) within the scope of their employment; and (c) at least in
part for the benefit of the corporation. " 139 The Model Penal Code, as
well as numerous state statutes, provide for corporate criminal
liability in case of significant misdeeds by senior corporate officers. 140
Thus, under United States' law, corporations, even if exempt from
ATCA liability, would continue to face the possibility of criminal
prosecution directed at the corporate entity itself.
Under international criminal law, corporations have not
traditionally faced criminal liability .141 The Nuremberg tribunal
famously declined to prosecute the Farben and Krupp corporations
and instead focused on prosecuting their corporate officers. 142 When
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was negotiated,
the decision was made to exclude corporate liability from the statute
- despite proposals to the contrary. 143 The statutes of other ad hoc
tribunals, such as the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals, also did not
extend criminal responsibility to corporations. 144 However, more
recently, international criminal law has been evolving to consider the
concept of corporate criminal responsibility. 145 In addition, the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon recently held contempt proceedings against a
corporation, 146 and the new Malabo Protocol extended the jurisdiction
138. See Doyle, supra note 133, at 1.
139. Id. at 3.
140. Id. at 3-4.
141. Ronald C. Slye, Corporations, Veils, and International
Liability, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 955, 955 (2008).

Criminal

142. See U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, Law Rep. of Trials of War Criminals:
Volume X, at 52, 151 (1949) (discussing the Farben and Krupp
findings).
143. See Joanna Kyriakakis, Corporate Criminal Liability and the ICC
Statute: The Comparative Law Challenge, 56 (3) NETH. INT'L. L. REV.
Neth. 333, 334-35 (2009) (discussing the arguments made for and
against the adoption of corporate liability into the Rome Statute).
144. See id. at 357-58 (noting that the tribunals focused primarily on the
most responsible individuals and left lesser offenders to national
mechanisms).
145. Int'l Comm'n of Jurists, Corporate Complicity 8 Legal Accountability
Volume 1: Facing the Facts and Charting a Legal Path, at 1 (2008).
146. See Special Tribunal of Lebanon, Al Jadeed S.A.L. & Ms Khayat ,
https: / /www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/contempt-cases/stl-14-05
[https://perma.cc/YS5A-U4ZR] (Last visited Nov. 11, 2017) (outlining
the procedural holdings in the case against Al Jadeed S.A.L. and Ms.
Khayat).
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of the proposed African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples
Right to corporations. 147 Thus, it may be argued that even under
international criminal law, the concept of corporate criminal
responsibility is an emerging norm. As the Appeals Chamber of the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon held in the contempt case, "[c]orporate
criminal liability is on the verge of attaining, at the very least, the
status of a general principle of law applicable under international
law." .148 In sum, corporations may face criminal liability under
domestic law in the United States, and they may, in the near future,
also face liability under international criminal law within future ad
hoc tribunals.
Imposing criminal responsibility on corporations may be
preferable to allowing lawsuits under the ATCA. 149 First, criminal
prosecutions are initiated by prosecutors who often exercise
tremendous discretion before initiating a potentially difficult corporate
case. 150 In the case of foreign corporations, prosecutors could arguably
exercise additional discretion to ensure that United States' foreign
relations were not undermined. Private plaintiffs bringing lawsuits
under the ATCA typically do not have foreign relations-based
concerns and almost all scholars have recognized that ATCA lawsuits

147. Several scholars and international bodies are in favor of extending
criminal liability to corporations. See generally Payam Akhavan, Are
International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentive to Peace? Reconciling
Judicial Romanticism with Political Realism, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 624
(2009); see also B. Fisse and J. Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and
Accountability 46 (1993) (arguing that corporations are in some ways
even "better endowed than individuals" to be held responsible and
punished); see also SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, Al Jadeed S.A.L.
8
Ms
Khayat
(STL-14-05),
https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the
cases/contempt-cases/stl-14-05 [https:/ /perma.cc/X6NY-96QM] (The
Special Tribunal for Lebanon held contempt proceedings against a
media company); see also Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on
the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Malabo
Protocol), Art. 46C, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7804
treaty-0045_-_protocol_on_amendments_to_the_protocol_on_the_
statute_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and_human_rights_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B88X-BUS3] (The Malabo Protocol extends criminal
liability to corporations).
148. In the case against New TV S.A.L and Al Khayat, Case No. STL-14-05,
Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Personal Jurisdiction in
Contempt Proceedings, , 67 (Oct. 2, 2014) (Special Trib. for Lebanon).
149. See James G. Stewart, The Tum to Corporate Criminal Liability for
International Crimes: Transcending the Alien Tort Statute, 47 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 121, 154 (2014) (stating that the turn to criminal justice
offers "both nuance and a greater degree of precision" than that in ATS
litigation).
150. See id. at 184 (detailing the system of legal opportunities which
influence prosecutorial discretion).
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have significant potential to disrupt foreign relations. 151 Thus, criminal
prosecutions against foreign corporations which may have aided and
abetted in human rights abuses may be beneficial over privately
initiated lawsuits under the ATCA.
Second, corporations, if convicted in a criminal trial, may face
stiff penalties and reputational harm. 152 Although ATCA plaintiffs
have been, in some instances, able to collect significant damages from
corporate defendants, damages in a private lawsuit produce much less
reputational and financial harm than criminal penalties. 153 In addition,
some ATCA plaintiffs have settled their cases against corporations,
and in these instances, damages paid by the relevant corporation
remain unknown and typically do little to harm the corporation's
reputation. 154 Finally, criminal prosecutions against corporations for
human rights violations may lead toward the drafting of more
stringent legislation and regulations concerning corporations, which
may ultimately lead toward improving corporate behavior.
Third, in addition to prosecuting corporations in the criminal
system, corporate officers themselves may face both civil and criminal
liability. 155 Even if the Jesner court were to foreclose corporate
liability under the A TCA, the statute could remain to be used against
individual corporate officers as defendants. In addition, corporate
officers could face criminal liability in United States' courts, if
plaintiffs can demonstrate that corporate officers somehow
individually committed or contributed toward the commission of
human rights violations. 156 While individual corporate officers' pockets
may be less deep than those of multinational corporations and this
151. See Howe, supra note 1.
152. See Doyle, supra note 133, at 21 ("A corporation operated for criminal
purposes or by criminal means should be fined at a level sufficient to
strip it of all of its assets").
153. See Stewart, supra note 149, at 179-180 (discussing the "expressive
function" of criminal law).
154. According to a 2009 report, several ATCA cases have resulted in
settlements where plaintiffs have been able to collect judgment. See
Alien Tort Statute Cases Resulting in Plaintiff Victories, THE VIEW
FROM LL2 (Nov. 11, 2009) https://viewfromll2.com/2009/11/11/alien
tort-statute-cases-resulting-in-plaintiff-victories/
[https:/ /perma.cc/DSTA-SPNG].
155. See Stewart, supra note 149, at 142 (noting that some jurisdictions
begin with cases against corporate officers and resort to the corporation
only when those cases fail).
156. See Wolfgang Kaleck & Miriam Saage-Maa, Corporate Accountability
for Human Rights Violations Amounting to International Crimes: The
Status Quo and Its Challenges, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 699, 703 (2010)
(explaining that several cases against individual officers have been
brought before civil and criminal courts in the U.S.).
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option less attractive to ATCA plaintiffs, ATCA-based lawsuits
against corporate officers combined with criminal prosecutions against
corporations would go a long way toward deterring future corporate
human rights violations. 157 This general outcome may benefit ATCA
plaintiffs as a class of individuals having suffered human rights
violations, with a significant interest in preventing and deterring
future abuses. 158
CONCLUSION

While it remains uncertain how the Supreme Court will decide in
Jesner, the case will hopefully clarify Kiobel's uncertainties with

respect to the presumption of extraterritoriality, and with respect to
the issue of applicable law. 159 It is this author's opinion that in light of
the way in which the Supreme Court formulated the legal issue, and
in light of the fact that the Court granted certiorari only four years
post-Kiobel, the Court will more likely rule in favor of the
plaintiffs/petitioners. If the Court were to rule in favor of the
plaintiffs/petitioners, it will most likely issue a narrow holding which
will limit future ATCA cases against corporations to only certain
types of claims (like terrorism) and to corporations with significant
nexus to the United States. Furthermore, if the Court were to rule in
favor of extending ATCA liability to corporations, it is likely that the
Court would decide that the issue of corporate liability itself should
be governed by domestic law, as opposed to international law. Finally,
even if the Court were to rule in favor of the defendants/respondents,
foreclosing corporate liability under the ATCA, corporations could
still face judicial scrutiny in the United States. Corporations would
continue to face criminal liability in United States' courts (which may
be preferable to private lawsuits under the ATCA), and corporate
officers themselves would continue to face both civil and criminal

157. See Mordechai Kremnitzer, A Possible Case for Imposing Criminal
Liability on Corporations in International Criminal Law, 8 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 909, 915 (2010) (arguing that the impact of criminal
prosecution on a corporation's good name is "graver" and " ...adds to the
deterrent effect").
158. See Developments in the Law - International Criminal Law: Corporate
Liability for Violations of International Human Rights Law, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 2025, 2041 (2001) (explaining that judgments would have a
"general deterrent effect" by incentivizing corporations to internalize
liability considerations).
159. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No.
16-499 (U.S. Oct. 11, 2017) (counsel for the U.S. acknowledging that the
Second Circuit had not reached the extraterritoriality question because
"...it relied on its rule that a corporation can never be a defendant in an
Alien Tort Statute.").
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liability. 160 It is thus this author's opinion that despite the relatively
high likelihood that the Supreme Court will decide in favor of
plaintiffs/petitioners, it would be preferable to limit corporate liability
under the ATCA. International law does not contain a universal norm
on civil corporate liability, and criminal prosecutions against
corporations and judicial processes directed against corporate officers
may deter future corporate misbehavior better than an ATCA-based
private lawsuit, without disrupting United States' foreign relations. 161

160. See Stewart, supra note 149, at 142 (describing the ATS as similar to
other "safety net[s]" allowing the prosecution of individuals when a
corporation is immune).
161. See Daniel Prince, Corporate Liability For International Torts: Did The

Second Circuit Misinterpret The Alien Tort Statute?, 8 SETON HALL
Cm. REV. 43, 57 (2012) (noting that corporate liability has not "ripened
into a specific, universal, obligatory norm of international law").
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